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**PhD Candidate**

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**Fields of Concentration:**

Public Economics  
Industrial Organization  
Labor Economics  
Econometrics

**Desired Teaching:**

Public Economics  
Industrial Organization  
Labor Economics  
Econometrics

**Graduate Studies:**

University of Gothenburg, 2014 to present  
PhD Economics

Stanford University, 2017-2018  
Visiting Researcher at Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research

University of Oxford, 2016  
Visiting DPhil Student at Department of Economics

**Undergraduate Studies:**

University of Warwick, Lund University, 2012 - 2014  
MSc Economic Development and Growth

Kharkiv National University of Economics, 2007 – 2012  
BSc, MSc Mathematical Economics

**Working Papers:**

“Optimal Regulations and Design of Unemployment Insurance” [job market paper]

“Behavioral Responses and Design of Inheritance Taxation”, with Simon Schürz

**Works in Progress:**

“Determinants of University Competition and Student Demand in Higher Education:  
Evidence from Australia”, with Natalie Bachas

**Fellowships, Honors and Awards:**

Siamon Stiftelsen Travel Grant, 2018  
Donationsnämnden Travel Grant, 2018  
Hedelliusstendium Travel Grant, 2016  
Nordic Tax Council Research Grant, 2016  
Knut och Alice Wallenbergs Travel Grant, 2016  
Adlerbertska Stipendiestiftelsen Travel Grants, 2016  
Paul och Marie Berghaus donationsfond Travel Grant, 2015, 2016

**Research Experience:**

*International Labour Organization, Consultant, 2017*

*International Labour Organization, Consultant, 2016*

**Teaching Experience:**

*Lecturer and Teaching Assistant, Advanced Industrial Organization (Graduate level), 2016 - 2019*

*Teaching Assistant, Basic Econometrics (Undergraduate level), 2018*

*Thesis Advisor, (1 graduate and 6 undergraduate students), 2017 - 2018*

*Lecturer and Teaching Assistant, Research Methods (Graduate level), 2015*

**Presentations and Summer Schools:**

Labor Economics workshop, University of Gothenburg, 2018

Public Economics seminar, Stanford University, 2018

Industrial Organization seminar, Stanford University, 2018

Price Theory Camp, University of Chicago, 2017

Summer Schools on Socioeconomic Inequality (HCEO), University of Chicago, 2016

Health Economics Conference, University of Gothenburg (discussant), 2013

**References:**

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**Technical Skills:**

*Programing Languages:* Python, R, Julia, Java, C++, MATLAB

*Data Analytics Tools:* Stata, SQL, Pandas, Numpy, Sklearn, Keras, TensorFlow, Tableau,  
Jupyter, Hive, Spark, Presto, ArcGIS

*Other Software & Tools:* LaTeX, Git

**Languages:**

English (fluent), Russian (native), Ukrainian (native), Swedish (proficient)

## Dissertation Abstract

Government policies intervene in many areas of economic and social environment in most countries. The importance of these policies stems from a variety of distortions that hinder efficiency of markets or result in undesirable socioeconomic outcomes. However, the design of those policies is crucial to ensure the desired outcomes without causing distortions themselves. My dissertation focuses on studying the design and regulations in government policies and markets with a view to these trade-offs.

In Chapter One, **Optimal Regulations and Design of Unemployment Insurance** (job market paper), I use the institutional features of the Swedish UI system, which combines both voluntary and mandatory programs, to study the optimal design and regulation of UI. The Swedish system differs from nearly universally adopted mandatory UI that presumably prevents welfare losses associated with selection in insurance markets. With detailed administrative data, I estimate a structural model of insurance choice that captures heterogeneity in preferences and quality of information about future unemployment risks. The model is used to study several alternative designs of the UI program. The results suggest that mandating UI would be a welfare-improving policy only if the government is willing to provide high subsidies because of large heterogeneity in preferences for insurance even in the absence of a moral hazard response. In contrast, an alternative two-part tariff contract results in 8.8% higher consumer surplus on average for all subsidy levels. In addition, contracts with fixed length and enrollment timing dominate all other considered options and generate considerable consumer surplus gains from 75% to 94% on average depending on the contract duration.

In Chapter Two, **Behavioral Responses and Design of Inheritance Taxation** (with Simon Schürz), I study the effect of the design of intergenerational wealth taxes on government revenues and distortions that it bring to bequest allocations and wealth accumulation. In the presence of the taxes on intergenerational wealth transfers decedents can utilize a number of legal strategies to avoid paying taxes. These strategies include adjustments of wealth, changes in the distribution of inheritances and bequest ceding among others. We use detailed individual level administrative data to estimate a model that allows recovering donor preferences and simulate counterfactual polices to inform optimal taxation design. We find that although individuals have strong preferences towards equal bequest allocation, they do show considerable heterogeneity in preferences for passing wealth on to children with specific socio-economic statuses and demographic characteristics. The counterfactual analysis suggests that a system with heir-level tax base would generate considerable tax revenue gains without imposing large distributional inefficiencies. We also find that an alternative estate tax design would further increase budget gains and does not distort the preferences for bequest allocation.

In Chapter Three, **Determinants of University Competition and Student Demand in Higher Education: Evidence from Australia** (with Natalie Bachas), we study the effect of government regulations in college markets. We exploit detailed administrative data from an Australian college admission center. The data contain detailed records on all student applications and test score admission cutoffs for application periods from 2004 to 2017. In the system with government-set tuition fees depending on national field priorities, universities compete for a number and quality of students by setting these cutoffs. We primarily leverage exogenous time-variation in national study field priorities to study the determinants of equilibrium matches between students and colleges, and the effect of tuition fees regulations on college competition and students' welfare.